Marquette Law Review
Volume 96
Issue 4 Symposium: Wickersham Commission

Article 10

The Engineer as Progressive: The Wickersham
Commission in the Arc of Herbert Hoover’s Life
and Work
Samuel Walker

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Repository Citation
Samuel Walker, The Engineer as Progressive: The Wickersham Commission in the Arc of Herbert Hoover’s Life and Work, 96 Marq. L. Rev.
1165 (2013).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol96/iss4/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

15 WALKER (DO NOT DELETE)

6/23/2013 11:11 AM

THE ENGINEER AS PROGRESSIVE:
THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION IN THE
ARC OF HERBERT HOOVER’S LIFE AND
WORK
SAMUEL WALKER *
I.
II.
III.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 1165
HERBERT HOOVER: ENGINEER AND PROGRESSIVE ................ 1167
HOOVER’S PRE-PRESIDENTIAL YEARS ...................................... 1169
A. The World War I Years ........................................................... 1169
B. Hoover as Secretary of Commerce ......................................... 1171
IV. HOOVER AS PRESIDENT ................................................................ 1173
V.
THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION................................................. 1176
A. The Crime Commission Movement of the 1920s .................. 1176
B. The Wickersham Commission Reports.................................. 1179
1. The Report on Prohibition ................................................ 1179
2. The Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement .......... 1181
3. The Report on Prosecution and the Administration of
Criminal Justice as a System............................................. 1186
4. The Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation
Laws of the United States .................................................. 1188
5. Other Wickersham Reports ............................................. 1189
VI. AFTER WICKERSHAM: SUBSEQUENT CRIME
COMMISSIONS ................................................................................. 1192
VII. A BRIEF NOTE ON HERBERT HOOVER’S
POST-PRESIDENTIAL YEARS ........................................................ 1195
VIII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 1196
I. INTRODUCTION
The Wickersham Commission, the first national crime commission in
American history, has never received much attention in biographies of
President Herbert Hoover or histories of his presidential
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administration. 1 In many respects, this is understandable. Only one of
the fourteen reports of the Commission gained any significant public
attention when it was published, which was mainly because of its
perceived failure, while three others had some long-term impact on
public policy that was subtle and difficult to pinpoint conclusively.
Accounts of Hoover’s presidency have understandably been dominated
by the economic calamity of the Great Depression that struck only
2
months after he was sworn into office. Hoover himself assigned little
significance to the Wickersham Commission in his later years. In his
three-volume Memoirs he devotes exactly a page and a half to it, and his
3
comments are confined to the issue of prohibition.
Nonetheless, the Wickersham Commission, officially the National
4
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, deserves serious
attention, as it amplifies important themes in Hoover’s life and work
and occupies an important place in the history of American criminal
justice. With regard to Hoover this Article argues that the Wickersham
Commission was fully consistent with his public career before and
during his presidency and his belief in the need for facts to guide public
policy making. With regard to criminal justice, the Wickersham
Commission is a link between the neglected but important crime
commission movement in the 1920s and subsequent crime commissions
5
from the late 1930s to the 1960s.
This Article has two goals. First, it seeks to place the Wickersham
Commission in the context of Herbert Hoover’s life and work. Second,
it seeks to place the Commission in the context of criminal justice
reform and the history of national crime commissions. Section II
discusses how Hoover’s public life was guided by his training as an
1. The exception is James D. Calder’s book on Herbert Hoover. See JAMES D.
CALDER, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL POLICY:
HERBERT HOOVER’S INITIATIVES (1993). For another discussion of the Wickersham
Commission, see SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 154–70 (2d ed. 1998).
2. See, e.g., MARTIN L. FAUSOLD, THE PRESIDENCY OF HERBERT C. HOOVER (1985);
EDGAR EUGENE ROBINSON & VAUGHN DAVIS BORNET, HERBERT HOOVER, PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES (1975).
3. HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE CABINET AND THE
PRESIDENCY, 1920–1933, at 277–78 (2d ed. 1952).
4. The official records of the Commission consist of twenty-six reels of microfilm.
RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT:
PART 1 (1997) (containing fifteen reels); RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION ON
LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT: PART 2 (1999) (containing eleven reels).
5. WALKER, supra note 1, at 154, 178–79.
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engineer, his political ideology as a moderate Republican progressive,
and to a limited extent, his religious background as a Quaker. Section
III examines Herbert Hoover’s pre-presidential career and argues that
the Wickersham Commission was a natural extension of his political
views and actions as a public official. Section IV covers selected aspects
of Hoover’s presidency other than the Wickersham Commission by
establishing the connection between his reform ambitions as President
and the Commission. Section V first examines the crime commission
movement of the 1920s, which set a precedent for the Wickersham
Commission, and second examines the more important Commission
reports that have lasting relevance. Section VI gives brief attention to
the various post-Wickersham crime commissions and their relationship
to the Wickersham Commission. Section VII offers a brief comment on
the Hoover Commission, Hoover’s last important contribution as a
public servant.
II. HERBERT HOOVER: ENGINEER AND PROGRESSIVE

6

There is an arc to the life and work of Herbert Hoover, marked by a
strong consistency with regard to his professional training as an engineer
and the political ideology that shaped his career as a public servant. The
Wickersham Commission links his pre-presidential achievements, his
efforts at domestic reform while President (apart from the Depression
and his response to it), and his one major activity in his post-presidential
7
years. In all of his public activities, Hoover was the consummate
engineer, dedicated to problem solving through practical solutions based
on a careful study of the facts. As both Secretary of Commerce and as
President he sponsored numerous commissions and conferences
addressing particular social and economic needs. His commitment was
8
always “investigation before action.”
Politically, Hoover was a moderate Republican and political
progressive, arguably the last of that breed to hold major political

6. The phrase “The Engineer as Progressive” is the title of Chapter II of JOAN HOFF
WILSON, HERBERT HOOVER: FORGOTTEN PROGRESSIVE 31–53 (Oscar Handlin ed., 1975),
and is the source of the interpretation of Hoover in this Article.
7. See THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT v–vi (1949) [hereinafter REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH].
8. See RAY LYMAN WILBUR & ARTHUR MASTICK HYDE, THE HOOVER POLICIES 41
(1937).
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office. 9 Biographer David Burner summed up Hoover’s combination of
engineering and progressivism as “technical proficiency, turned to
10
humane needs.” Historian Joan Hoff Wilson aptly subtitled her short
11
He
but insightful biography of Hoover, “Forgotten Progressive.”
resembled the two famous progressive presidents, Theodore Roosevelt
and Woodrow Wilson, in that he believed in the promise of America for
the individual and for business enterprise. None of the three presidents
was a radical who challenged the fundamental institutions of society and
the underlying values of individualism and the free enterprise system.
Their goal was to eliminate obstacles to progress, particularly the trusts,
political machines, and inhumane working conditions. Biographers have
also detected the influence Hoover’s Quaker background had
throughout his career, in his humanitarian undertakings in World War I,
his long concern for child welfare, and his broader emphasis on
12
Hoover’s
voluntary cooperation rather than government coercion.
short 1922 political testament, American Individualism, was a
thoroughly conventional political tract, expressing pieties about
individualism, social and economic progress, and small government. As
this Article will argue, however, it did not truly reflect his policies as
Secretary of Commerce or as President where he pursued an activist,
13
albeit limited, role for government. Although Hoover is commonly
linked with his two Republican predecessors, Warren G. Harding and
Calvin Coolidge, as President, he rejected their vision of a small and
passive federal government in favor of government activism. The
standard cliché about the Republican Party being beholden to laissezfaire economic policies applies to his predecessors but not at all to
Hoover. In fact, Hoover was not entirely certain which party he would
commit to in the 1920 presidential election until late March of that
14
year.

9. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6, at 73–76.
10. DAVID BURNER, HERBERT HOOVER: A PUBLIC LIFE 212 (1978).
11. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6.
12. See, e.g., BURNER, supra note 10, at 8–9, 212–14; DAVID HINSHAW, HERBERT
HOOVER: AMERICAN QUAKER 34–58 (1950).
13. See GARY DEAN BEST, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: HERBERT
HOOVER IN TRANSITION, 1918–1921, at 91–94 (1975). See generally HERBERT HOOVER,
AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM (1922).
14. BURNER, supra note 10, at 150–52.
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III. HOOVER’S PRE-PRESIDENTIAL YEARS
In his pre-presidential years, Herbert Hoover was one of the great
success stories in American public life, as he achieved success and public
renown in every venture. 15 Before entering public life he was a highly
successful professional engineer, achieving significant financial wealth
and establishing a reputation as an extremely capable executive. In
early 1920 he was briefly considered as a possible candidate for
President, and was even considered a possibility by some leading
16
Democrats.
A. The World War I Years
Engaged in international engineering enterprises, Hoover was living
17
in London in August 1914 when World War I broke out. Americans
living in England, along with tourists and others who fled the continent,
found themselves stranded and in many cases without financial
resources. To provide assistance, and at the request of the British
government, the American embassy created the Committee of
American Residents in London for Assistance of American Travelers,
18
with Hoover as chair. The project was a great success and helped
provide short-term financial help to stranded Americans and eventually
arranged the return to the United States of an estimated 100,000
19
people. With this effort, Hoover’s career as a private businessman
20
ended and his career as a public servant began.
The success of the stranded Americans effort led the American
Ambassador to England, Walter Hines Page, to ask Hoover to chair the
21
Committee for Relief in Belgium (CRB). Famine among the Belgian
and French people under German occupation was a major crisis, and in
the United States their suffering became one of the major items in the

15. See generally 2 GEORGE H. NASH, THE LIFE OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE
HUMANITARIAN 1914–1917 (1988) [hereinafter 2 NASH]; 3 GEORGE H. NASH, THE LIFE OF
HERBERT HOOVER: MASTER OF EMERGENCIES 1917–1918 (1996) [hereinafter 3 NASH].
16. BURNER, supra note 10, at 151.
17. 2 NASH, supra note 15, at 4.
18. Id. at 4, 7.
19. See id. at 12.
20. Id. at 14. More information can be found in the first three volumes of a four volume
series which is devoted entirely to Hoover’s World War I relief efforts. See generally 1
HERBERT HOOVER, AN AMERICAN EPIC (1959); 2 HERBERT HOOVER, AN AMERICAN
EPIC (1960); 3 HERBERT HOOVER, AN AMERICAN EPIC (1961).
21. 2 NASH, supra note 15, at 32.
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government’s propaganda campaign of demonizing Germany. 22 Under
Hoover’s leadership, which included not just coping with the logistics of
food transport but also navigating complex political conflicts among the
Allies, the CRB was extremely successful. The committee oversaw the
delivery of 2.5 million tons of food, which fed an estimated 9 million
23
people.
On the basis of his two successes in England, when the United States
entered the European war in August 1917, President Woodrow Wilson
24
asked Hoover to head the U.S. Food Administration. This was a major
undertaking as the American economy almost ground to a halt under
25
the demands of mobilizing the country for the national war effort.
Mobilizing for an international war was the first truly national
emergency since the United States had spread across the continent and
been transformed by industrialization. The country had no prior
experience and the then very small federal government was completely
unequipped for the challenge. The effort included drafting, training,
and feeding an army; getting that force to Europe; coordinating
agricultural and industrial production; mobilizing public opinion
26
27
through a propaganda effort; and suppressing virtually all dissent. By
28
the end of 1917, severe food and fuel shortages existed in many cities.
Congress had responded in August 1917 by giving President Wilson
extraordinary power over the economy, including all aspects of the food
industry with the Lever Act (officially the Food and Fuel Conservation
29
Act).
Hoover accepted Wilson’s offer (there is evidence that he actually
eagerly sought the position), declined a salary, and as with every venture
30
in his life, he took complete charge of the situation. While the Lever
Act granted the administration extraordinary power, Hoover chose to
exercise it largely indirectly, preferring a policy of voluntary
22. See GEORGE CREEL, HOW WE ADVERTISED AMERICA: THE FIRST TELLING OF
THE AMAZING STORY OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION THAT CARRIED THE
GOSPEL OF AMERICANISM TO EVERY CORNER OF THE GLOBE 420–21 (1920).
23. 2 NASH, supra note 15, at 362.
24. See 3 NASH, supra note 15, at 71–72.
25. Id.
26. See generally CREEL, supra note 22.
27. See PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 51–53 (1979).
28. 3 NASH, supra note 15, at 219–20.
29. Id. at 71–72.
30. Id. at 21, 35.
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cooperation. With a combination of exhortation and the threat of
penalties, Hoover managed food production and distribution through
voluntary trade associations that managed prices.
The public
exhortation effort was considerable, as Hoover aggressively promoted
31
the slogan “Food will win the war.”
His record as head of the Food Administration was almost
universally regarded as an enormous success. The war ended in
November 1918 with Hoover enjoying a reputation as one of the heroes
of the war effort, an enormously capable public official, and a promising
political future. Although reluctantly, he allowed a committee to work
for his nomination as the Republican candidate for President in 1920,
while some prominent Democrats seriously considered him as their
32
nominee.
B. Hoover as Secretary of Commerce
Hoover served eight years as Secretary of Commerce under
Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. In that position he
promoted an activist role for the government that was out of step with
the presidents he served and the reputation of the Republican Party in
the 1920s as beholden to a laissez-faire policy on the role of government
and the economy. His many commissions, conferences, and task forces
addressing problems that inhibited social and economic progress clearly
marked him as a progressive and not a conservative. Historian Hoff
Wilson characterizes his role as Secretary of Commerce as “Domestic
33
Dynamo,” and one political cartoon depicted a “traffic problem” in the
34
nation’s capital caused by a parade of Hoover’s many commissions.
Hoover departed from 1920s Republican orthodoxy on several
issues. Most notably, when asked by President Harding to be Secretary
of Commerce, Hoover insisted on having “a voice on major policies
involving labor,” believing that “commerce and industry could [not]
35
make progress unless labor advanced with them.” (This was a reason
36
He
many conservative Republicans opposed his nomination.)
supported passage of the 1926 Railway Labor Act, a forerunner of the
31. BURNER, supra note 10, at 102; 3 NASH, supra note 15, at 153.
32. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6, at 73–78.
33. See generally id. at 79–121.
34. Id. at 119.
35. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6, at 94–95; HOOVER, supra note 3, at 101.
36. Hoover’s nomination as Secretary of Commerce was opposed by many conservative
Republicans. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6, at 79–80.
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1935 National Labor Relations Act (known popularly as the Wagner
37
Act), as a means of providing orderly resolution of labor disputes. His
many articles and speeches while Secretary covered the business-related
subjects one would expect of a Secretary of Commerce, but Hoover also
gave considerable attention to social problems such as home ownership,
education, the welfare of children, illiteracy, and the status of AfricanAmericans.
His concern for the welfare of children was particularly notable. In
1920, even before entering the Cabinet, he was active in child welfare
issues; for example, he consolidated several private agencies into the
38
American Child Welfare Association, of which he was president. In
his memoirs he devoted a short chapter to “Better Children,” covering
39
his activities in this area while Secretary of Commerce. He proclaimed
May Day in 1923 to be Children’s Health and Protection Day and
40
repeated the proclamation annually while President. Two years later
41
he suggested a Bill of Rights for Children. This novel idea anticipated
42
the children’s rights movement of the late 1960s by four decades.
On other social issues one of Hoover’s greatest achievements as
Secretary of Commerce was in handling relief for the victims of the 1927
Mississippi Flood, which still stands as one of the greatest natural
disasters to strike the United States. The flood inundated an estimated
16,570,627 acres in seven states, displaced an estimated 325,000 persons,
43
and killed between 250 and 500 people. The federal government was
37. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WORKER 1920–1933, at 215–16, 272–73 (1960). In fact, however, the decade of the 1920s
witnessed a devastating decline in unionism, as the federal courts willingly granted injunctions
that prohibited virtually all forms of union organizing. See id. at 190, 195–96. Hoover’s
efforts at cooperation and conciliation had little impact on the broader trend of events. See
id. at 252.
38. HOOVER, supra note 3, at 97.
39. See generally id. at 97–100. A guide to the papers from Hoover’s Commerce
Department years is available at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. The Papers of
Herbert Hoover, available at http://www.ecommcode2.com/hoover/research/hooverpapers/ho
over/commerce/hcomsubj.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
40. WILBUR & HYDE, supra note 8, at 55.
41. Id. at 55–56.
42. As President, Hoover expressed some concern about certain civil liberties issues,
notably the status of persons still in prison for World War I violations of the Espionage Act,
but he never articulated these concerns publicly and never took any bold action on them. See
SAMUEL WALKER, PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM WILSON TO OBAMA: A STORY
OF POOR CUSTODIANS 52, 62 (2012).
43. PETE DANIEL, DEEP’N AS IT COME: THE 1927 MISSISSIPPI RIVER FLOOD 10 (1977).
Unfortunately, there are wildly varying estimates on numbers of acres flooded,
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very small in those years and had essentially no institutional capacity for
44
responding to a disaster of such proportions. President Coolidge asked
Hoover to coordinate relief efforts, with the Red Cross serving as the
45
principal agency. In addition to public appeals that raised millions of
dollars, Hoover was able to generate several millions more in federal
46
This represented a significant departure from orthodox
assistance.
Republican policy of limited government in the decade. He also played
a major role in designing and supporting the 1928 Mississippi Flood
Control Bill that gave the federal government responsibility for
47
The law more closely
rebuilding levees and preventing floods.
48
resembled the New Deal rather than 1920s Republicanism. His only
misstep in the flood relief effort was his attempt to cover up widespread
discrimination against African-Americans among flood victims. He
created the Colored Advisory Commission to advise him on the matter,
but when its report confirmed the worst allegations he persuaded its
chair not to publicize it, promising to aid African-Americans once he
was President. He failed to follow through on that promise and
49
alienated African-American leaders as a result.
IV. HOOVER AS PRESIDENT
As President, Hoover continued the pattern he had established as
displaced persons, and deaths.
See, e.g., Stephen Ambrose, Great Flood,
NATIONALGEOGRAPHIC.COM (May 1, 2001), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/
05/0501_river4.html (“Twenty-seven thousand square miles were inundated. This was about
equal to the combined size of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont.
By July 1, even as the flood began to recede, 1.5 million acres were under water.”);
Mississippi River Flood of 1927, BRITANNICA.COM, http://www.britannica.com/EB
checked/topic/1481633/Mississippi-River-flood-of-1927 (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (“More than
23,000 square miles (60,000 square km) of land was submerged, hundreds of thousands of
people were displaced, and around 250 people died.”). These disparities are, at least in part,
because of the evolving nature of the river, and flood basin, and the inability to accurately
determine all flooding at one point in time.
44. See JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927 AND
HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA 371–72 (1997).
45. Id. at 240–41.
46. Id. at 367, 369.
47. See id. at 401–07.
48. Id. at 407; DANIEL, supra note 43, at 150 (explaining the details of the law).
49. See DONALD J. LISIO, HOOVER, BLACKS, & LILY-WHITES: A STUDY OF SOUTHERN
STRATEGIES 6–7, 14, 70–71 (1985). Hoover did not mention this embarrassing aspect of the
Mississippi flood story in his 1952 Memoirs. See generally HOOVER, supra note 3, at 125–31.
Although there is some metion in the memoir, there are no entries in the Index to “negroes”
or “race” in this volume of his Memoirs. Id. at 518–19.
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Secretary of Commerce by creating a seemingly endless array of
commissions and conferences. His responsibilities as President, in fact,
only gave him a wider field for such activities. Nine months into his
presidency he jokingly told an audience, “[y]ou have been misled into
the impression that I shall soon appoint [a commission] every day. That
50
is wrong—I shall probably need to appoint two a day.” One historian
counted thirty presidential sponsored conferences and commissions by
mid-1932; another historian estimated there were 3,000 conferences on
various issues during Hoover’s twelve years as Secretary of Commerce
51
and President. Biographer David Burner titles his first chapter on
Hoover as President “The Reform Presidency”; in the months before
the Depression overtook the country his presidency represented “a
remarkable experiment in developing new approaches to old
52
In the context of this active engagement with social
problems.”
problems, the Wickersham Commission was simply business as usual for
the Hoover Administration.
The range of issues covered clearly refutes any suggestion that he
was a business-oriented Republican committed to laissez-faire ideology.
Instead, the issues mark him as a progressive, more in tune with the
concerns of the Democratic Party presidents who preceded and
followed him as President, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D.
53
A sampling of these efforts include the President’s
Roosevelt.
Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in Haiti (1929–
1930), the President’s Committee on the Conservation and
Administration of the Public Domain (1929–1933), the Advisory
Committee on Education; the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics; the White House Conference on Home Building and
Ownership; the Child Health & Protection Conference; the Conference
on the Crisis in Education (1932) (which prompted Hoover to
considered creating a Department of Education); a National Advisory
54
Council on Illiteracy; and more.
50. WILBUR & HYDE, supra note 8, at 41.
51. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6, at 82. The claim of 3,000 events is not documented in
specific detail.
52. BURNER, supra note 10, at 212.
53. See generally WILBUR & HYDE, supra note 8 (providing the best overview of the
scope of Hoover’s reform activities). Materials on the various reform activities are available
at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. Historical Materials,
HERBERT HOOVER PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM, www.ecommcode2.com/hoove
r/research/historicalmaterials/hmfed.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
54. See The Herbert Hoover Papers, HERBERT HOOVER PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND
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Hoover’s concern with the welfare of children, which was strong
while he was Secretary of Commerce, continued through his presidency.
He spoke and wrote every year on the subject, and annually he
55
proclaimed May 1st as Children’s Health and Protection Day. For the
56
White House Conference on Children in late 1930 he translated his
57
earlier idea of a Children’s Bill of Rights into a “Children’s Charter.”
Truly remarkable for its time, it called for a right to “parental, natal and
postnatal care” for mothers, “periodic health examinations” and dental
care for “every child”; diagnosis and training for disabled children, and
58
The proposal
an “adequate standard of living” for all families.
anticipated by four decades the idea of children’s rights and was radical
even by later standards.
Perhaps the most comprehensive and academically weighty
commission report was Recent Social Trends in the United States
59
(1933), which involved contributions from many of the nation’s leading
social scientists, was accompanied by thirteen separate monographs,
and, in twenty-nine chapters, covered virtually every important area of
60
American life. The report was evidently very well received and went
61
One suspects,
through several printings in the first seven months.
however, that the report had more impact among academics, who found
it a valuable resource at the time and today use it as a historical
benchmark on the various issues, than on immediate public policy.
Recent Social Trends most closely resembles the Wickersham
Commission as a detailed discussion of the topics covered.
If Hoover sought to be a reform president, the great tragedy of his
presidency was the Great Depression, which devastated the economy
and shattered all his dreams of social and economic progress through
enlightened leadership and gradual, government-encouraged reform.
The Wickersham Commission inevitably suffered the same fate.
MUSEUM,
http://www.ecommcode2.com/hoover/research/hooverpapers/index.html
(last
visited Mar. 2, 2013).
55. WILBUR & HYDE, supra note 8, at 55; Hoover Proclaims Child Health Day, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1929, at 5 (Presidential Proclamation printed in the N.Y. Times with a
foreword by Frank. B., Kellogg, Secretary of State).
56. See generally WILBUR & HYDE, supra note 8, at 58–71.
57. Id. at 64–67.
58. Id. at 65–66.
59. See 1 PRESIDENT’S RESEARCH COMM. ON SOC. TRENDS, RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1933) [Hereinafter RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS].
60. Id.
61. See id. at iv.
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V. THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION
Herbert Hoover turned his attention to the problem of crime and
criminal justice from the moment he took office as President. In his
Inaugural Address on March 4, 1929, he declared: “Justice must not fail
because the agencies of enforcement are either delinquent or
inefficiently organized. To consider these evils, to find their remedy, is
62
the most sore necessity of our times.” He followed up with another
comment on the need for a commission to study law enforcement at his
63
first press conference the next day.
The Wickersham Commission reflected the principles and practices
that characterized all of Hoover’s previous life and work. It was simply
one of the many commissions he appointed as Secretary of Commerce
or President that engaged recognized experts to develop practical
recommendations that would address inefficiencies and other problems
in the subject under study (in this case, the administration of criminal
justice). As this Article argues below, the Report on Prohibition, which
received most of the public comment upon publication, is a special case
because the subject was quite different from all but one of the other
commission reports—the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement.
64
Before turning to the work of the Wickersham Commission itself,
however, it is important to set the context for its work by examining the
crime commission movement of the 1920s.
A. The Crime Commission Movement of the 1920s
Not only was the Wickersham Commission fully consistent with
Herbert Hoover’s pre-presidential career, but it was also a logical and,
one might argue, inevitable outgrowth of the city and state-level crime
commission movement of the 1920s. There were innumerable studies of
the administration of criminal justice in that decade, many of which
were short, focused on a particular aspect of the criminal justice system,
62. Herbert Hoover, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1929), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=21804.
63. Herbert Hoover, The President’s News Conference (Mar. 5, 1929), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=21915. At that press conference he said,
One other question relates to the time I shall appoint the commission that I
mentioned yesterday. I notice it is referred to as a prohibition matter. It is not. It is
a question of the whole problem of law enforcement. I shall confer with the new
Attorney General at an early date as to the constitution of that body.
Id.
64. See generally supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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and of little interest today. 65 Three crime commissions, however, were
substantial undertakings and served as models for the Wickersham
66
67
The Cleveland [Ohio] Survey (1922), the Missouri
Commission.
68
69
Crime Survey (1926), and the Illinois Crime Survey (1929) were
comprehensive studies of the administration of justice that employed
recognized experts, adopted a self-conscious scientific approach, and
produced lengthy reports with substantive conclusions and
70
recommendations. Many of the authors of particular chapters were
71
also involved in the Wickersham Commission. In retrospect, it seems
almost inevitable that these city and state investigations would lead to
suggestions for a national study of crime and criminal justice.
Investigations of criminal justice agencies were nothing new in the
1920s. There had been a long history of investigations, particularly of
the police and prisons throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
72
century. These earlier efforts, however, were largely politically driven
exposés, often with an ill-disguised goal of embarrassing those in
73
Many were also highly moralistic in orientation, driven by
power.
outrage at, for example, the failure of authorities to enforce law limiting

65. See VIRGIL W. PETERSON, CRIME COMMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 3–4
(1945).
66. The best bibliography of the crime commissions is found in NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW
OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 258–65 (1931) [hereinafter
REPORT ON PROSECUTION]; see also PETERSON, supra note 65 (summarizing crime
commissions, authored by the Director of the Chicago Crime Commission). The National
Crime Commission of 1926–1927 focused on crime control, rather than the administration of
justice in the manner of the major crime commissions discussed here or the Wickersham
Commission. See generally SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM:
THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM 130–31 (1977).
67. RAYMOND FOSDICK ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND: REPORTS OF THE
CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
CLEVELAND, OHIO (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922) [hereinafter CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND]. A history of the survey is provided as well. See id. at 655–62.
68. JESSE W. BARRETT ET AL., THE MO. ASS’N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
MISSOURI CRIME SURVEY (1926).
69. THE ILL. ASS’N FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY (1929)
[hereinafter THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY]. The Illinois Crime Survey was dominated by its
investigation of organized crime in Chicago, which covered 272 pages and was the focus of the
final recommendations. See id. at xxii–xxvi, 815–1087, 1092–1100.
70. See WALKER, supra note 1, at 132, 152–54.
71. See, e.g., id. at 132, 154 (noting that August Vollmer participated in the Illinois Crime
Survey and the Wickersham Commission).
72. Id. at 127–29, 132, 134.
73. Id. at 114.
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the consumption of alcoholic beverages. 74
The most famous
investigation in this latter category was the 1894–1895 Lexow
75
Committee investigation of the New York City Police Department,
76
which was triggered by an 1892 sermon by the Rev. Charles H.
Parkhurst, a crusading Protestant minister.
The criminal justice investigations of the 1920s broke with this
tradition by adopting a self-conscious scientific approach that utilized
recognized experts to gather and analyze the facts and by making
77
This, of course, was an
recommendations based on those facts.
approach to social problems that Herbert Hoover took for granted and
pursued throughout his public career. The 1922 Cleveland Survey
established the model for the best of the subsequent crime commissions.
Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School, served as co-director with
78
his law school colleague Felix Frankfurter. Pound was the dominant
intellectual influence over the Cleveland Survey, writing the ninetythree-page final chapter of the report, “Criminal Justice in the
79
American City—A Summary,” and has been characterized as the
80
dominant intellectual influence over the Wickersham Commission.
Most notably, the three 1920s crime commissions began to discover,
very haltingly, aspects of the administration of justice that the
Wickersham Commission noted, and which in the 1960s were finally
recognized as the dominant characteristics of the process. The most
important issue was the flow of cases through the criminal justice system
(a term that was not conceptualized until the 1960s) and the exit of
many cases from the system. The Cleveland Survey noted the
81
“mortality” of cases in the administration of justice. This judgment
reflected the naïve assumption that most arrests should necessarily lead
to conviction and punishment. From this perspective, the “mortality” of
74. Id. at 158.
75. SPECIAL COMM. APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE POLICE DEP’T OF THE CITY OF
N.Y., REPORT (1895) (Senator Clarence Lexow chaired the committee).
76. See CHARLES H. PARKHURST, OUR FIGHT WITH TAMMANY 8, 240–52 (1895);
WALKER, supra note 66, at 44–45.
77. WALKER, supra note 1, at 152.
78. Id.
79. See Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in the American City—A Summary, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, supra note 67, at 559–650. The chapter was similar to
another of Pound’s books.
See generally ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA(1930).
80. See CALDER, supra note 1, at 59–60 (discussing the roles of Pound and Frankfurter).
81. See FOSDICK ET AL., supra note 67, at 89–96.
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cases suggested serious inefficiencies or other obstacles that needed to
be identified and corrected. The Illinois Crime Survey, meanwhile,
noted that, on average, out of 100 arrests, only 15 defendants were
82
The Wickersham Commission Report on
sentenced to prison.
Prosecution would also note these phenomena. As is argued later in the
Article, the crime commissions of the period were groping toward a
recognition of the administration of justice as a “criminal justice system”
in which a variety of organizational and legal factors affected the
progress of cases through that system.
We now turn our attention to the various Wickersham Commission
reports, which vary considerably in terms of their subject, political
implications, and relevance for future criminal justice studies. The
majority of the reports followed the model of the earlier crime
commissions, addressing administrative problems that affected the
efficiency of various agencies. The Report on Prohibition was unique in
addressing what was essentially a political question. The Report on
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement was unique in bringing a forceful civil
liberties perspective to the subject at hand. Finally, the Report on
Prosecution touched on issues that would become part of the
conventional wisdom in criminal justice studies in the 1960s.
B. The Wickersham Commission Reports
1. The Report on Prohibition
Of all the Wickersham Commission reports, the Report on
Prohibition received most of the public attention, mainly because it
failed to recommend repeal of Prohibition. The report actually consists
of two documents, the Preliminary Report on Observance and
Enforcement of Prohibition and the Report on the Enforcement of the
83
Prohibition had become
Prohibition Laws of the United States.
increasingly unpopular by the late 1920s and was seen as not only a
failure with respect to controlling alcohol consumption but also as the
source of several serious problems, including: pervasive non-compliance
by ordinary citizens who wanted to drink; loss of public confidence in
82. See THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, supra note 69, at 295.
83. The two documents were formally Reports No. 1 and No. 2 of the Commission. See
H.R. DOC. NO. 71-252, at 5–12 (1930) (PRELIMINARY REPORT ON OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT OF PROHIBITION); H.R. DOC. NO. 71-722 (1931) [hereinafter PROHIBITION
ENFORCEMENT REPORT] (Report on the Enforcement of the Prohibition Laws of the United
States).
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the law and criminal justice system; the corruption of law enforcement
agencies; abuses in enforcement of the law; and the growth of organized
84
crime, which delivered the alcohol that the public clearly wanted.
Many critics noted the glaring contradiction between the Commission’s
evidence on the failure of both observance of Prohibition and
85
enforcement of the law and the report’s recommendations.
The Report on Prohibition was unequivocal in its defense of
Prohibition, declaring that “[t]he Commission is opposed to repeal of
86
the Eighteenth Amendment.” Recommendation seven conceded that
“there is yet no adequate observance or enforcement,” and this was
followed by a series of recommendations seeking to improve the
87
effectiveness of enforcement. The report addressed the civil liberties
violations associated with enforcement only by opposing any “legislation
88
In this
allowing more latitude for federal searches and seizures.”
respect the report was in sharp contrast with the Report on Lawlessness
in Law Enforcement, which documented and condemned illegal police
89
behavior and offered some concrete recommendations to end it.
The failure of the Wickersham Commission to provide a satisfactory
response to the problem of Prohibition is readily explained. The
controversy over the attempt to prohibit the manufacture, sale and
consumption of alcohol was a political problem, rather than a technical
one, which could be addressed through adjustments to the existing
machinery of justice. The latter approach represented the basic
orientation of all of Hoover’s many commissions and conferences and
the crime commissions of the 1920s. The Prohibition controversy,
however, was of a different order altogether, representing a deep social
and cultural divide over the place of alcohol in society that touched on
deep-seated values. It can be usefully seen as another chapter in the
90
long-running “culture wars” that mark American history. There were
84. See, e.g., THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, supra note 69, at xxii–xxvi, 815–1087, 1092–
1100 (providing a lengthy treatment of organized crime).
85. CALDER, supra note 1, at 85–87 (labeling the problem as the “Prohibition
Albatross”).
86. PROHIBITION ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 83, at 83.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 84.
89. See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 1 340–47 (1931) [hereinafter REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS] (providing several conclusions and recommendations).
90. See generally JAMES DAVIDSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE AMERICA (1991); IRENE TAVISS THOMSON, CULTURE WARS AND ENDURING
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no adjustments that would resolve the issue of Prohibition, however. A
solution required confronting the values underlying it as social policy in
the first place.
2. The Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement
The only other Wickersham Commission report to gain any public
attention upon release, and the only other one to be out of step with the
orientation of the remaining reports, was the Report on Lawlessness in
91
In blunt and provocative language, the report
Law Enforcement.
declared that “the third degree—that is, the use of physical brutality, or
other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary confessions or
92
admissions—is widespread.” The abuses included “[p]rotracted
questioning,” “[t]hreats” and “intimidation,” “[p]hysical brutality,”
“illegal detention,” denial of access to counsel, and delay in producing a
93
prisoner before a magistrate. Local officials were unashamed about
their methods. The Commissioner of Police in Buffalo said “[i]f I have
to violate the Constitution or my oath of office, I’ll violate the
94
Beatings of suspects were widespread across the
Constitution.”
95
country. A suspect in Cleveland was forced to lie naked on the floor
96
and then lifted several times by his sex organs. The Detroit police used
a practice called “around the loop,” which involved moving arrestees
from one of the fifteen precinct stations to another to keep him from
97
family, friends, and legal representation.
The existence of the third degree was well known among local
criminal justice officials, and at least some other members of the general
98
public, but the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement was the first
time an authoritative government body had ever recognized and
condemned it in print, with thorough documentation, gathered through
99
field research and a national review of relevant court cases.
AMERICAN DILEMMAS (2010).
91. See REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS, supra note 89.
92. Id. at 4.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 102–03.
95. Id. passim.
96. Id. at 118.
97. Id. at 121.
98. The third degree had been a public controversy early in the twentieth century.
WALKER, supra note 66, at 125–26, 132–34.
99. Methods of the investigation are described in REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS, supra note
89, at 22–24.
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The report concluded with an evident attempt at balance by
100
The
summarizing the “excuses” and “evils” of the third degree.
excuses included that it “is necessary to get at the facts,” and “is used
only against the guilty”; that various “obstacles . . . make it almost
impossible to obtain convictions” any other way; that it is “inevitable
and . . . an excusable reaction to the brutality of criminals”; that
restricting the third degree would “impair the morale of the police”; and
101
that organized crime “renders traditional legal limitations outworn.”
The evils, meanwhile, included that the third degree creates the “danger
of false confession”; that it “impairs police efficiency” by discouraging
professional police practices; that it impairs the efficiency of the courts;
and finally that it “brutalizes the police, hardens the prisoner,” and
102
lowers public confidence in the criminal justice system.
The report recommended some significant changes in criminal
procedure, some of which anticipated changes in the law by several
decades, although it is not clear how they would address the third
degree problem directly. The recommendations included establishing
legal representation for defendants “in all cases” (which the Supreme
Court would not require until the 1960s), requiring the prosecution to
provide the defense with a list of its witnesses, eliminating race
discrimination in jury lists (an issue that would wait until the civil rights
movement of the 1960s), simplifying and clarifying the law on the
103
The recommendation to end
admissibility of evidence, and others.
race discrimination in jury lists, it might be noted, was one of only two
occasions where a Wickersham Commission report addressed
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or national origins (the other
being the Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the
104
Earlier observations in the report,
United States, discussed below).
however, undercut the likely effectiveness of the recommended changes
in criminal procedure with respect to the enormous problem of police
lawlessness. Changing the law of criminal procedure, it had previously
argued, would have only minimal impact because officials either do not
enforce existing law or deliberately disobey it. “Statutes can not [sic]
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 173.
Id. at 174–80.
Id. at 180–90.
See id. at 341–43.
See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEPORTATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1931) [hereinafter
REPORT ON DEPORTATION].
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cope with the third degree nor can police regulations. Without the will
to enforce them, these become words upon a printed page. The real
105
remedy lies in the will of the community.” For this problem, however,
the Wickersham Commission report had no recommendation.
Other Wickersham Commission reports also noted the overriding
importance of public attitudes, meaning specifically serious problems in
the administration of justice. This was most evident in the Report on
Prohibition, which noted the pervasive violation of the law and
106
The Report on Crime and the
indifference to enforcement abuses.
Foreign Born, meanwhile, noted the persistent public belief that
immigrants committed crime at a disproportionate rate compared with
107
Citing
native-born Americans, despite evidence to the contrary.
public opinion as the fundamental problem was essentially a fatalistic
conclusion, an admission that they had no immediate, practical reforms
to recommend, and that they had no real answer to the question of how
108
to change public attitudes.
The Report on Lawlesness in Law Enforcement stands out among
the various Wickersham reports because of its explosive conclusions and
its civil liberties orientation. No other report so bluntly accused public
officials of pervasive wrongdoing. Other reports blamed problems on
unqualified personnel, the influence of “politics,” or sheer public
indifference. There is, in fact, some mystery surrounding how the
Report on Lawlesness in Law Enforcement was initiated and how its
three co-authors were selected in the first place.
Co-author Walter Pollak was the ACLU’s premier Supreme Court
109
litigator in the 1920s and 1930s, arguing several landmark cases that
marked the beginnings of the revolution in the law of individual rights.
Most important, he argued Gitlow v. New York (1925), where the Court
established the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated
110
the First Amendment. He also argued two Scottsboro cases, notably

105. REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS, supra note 89, at 191.
106. PROHIBITION ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 83, at 22.
107. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIME
AND THE FOREIGN BORN 23, 195 (1931) [hereinafter CRIME AND FOREIGN BORN].
108. See id. at 195–96 (concluding and recommending that the Commission failed to
suggest ways to attempt to sway public opinion).
109. SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE
ACLU 79, 81–82 (1990). See generally Louis H. Pollak, Advocating Civil Liberties: A Young
Lawyer Before the Old Court, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1982).
110. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
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Powell v. Alabama (1932) where the Court held that Powell, facing a
possible death penalty, had been denied due process of law because he
111
The Scottsboro affair, where nine
had not had legal representation.
young African-American men were accused of raping two white women
near the small Alabama town of that name, and which involved
numerous court proceedings over many years, became a national cause
célèbre in the 1930s, and arguably the first great national civil rights
112
In addition to extending the principle of incorporation of the
case.
Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Scottsboro cases
marked the Court’s growing attention to issues of racial justice. Coauthor Zechariah Chafee of Harvard Law School was the reigning
authority on freedom of speech, based on his 1919 law review article and
113
1920 book on freedom of speech in wartime. His views played a major
role in shaping public opinion and the course of constitutional law in the
direction of greater protection of freedom of speech in the years
between the first and second world wars. He was also one of twelve
prominent attorneys (including Felix Frankfurter and Roscoe Pound)
who co-authored the report Illegal Practices of the United States
Department of Justice, a stinging critique of the famous “Palmer Raids”
of late 1919 and early 1920, where federal authorities arrested hundreds
114
of alleged radicals. Given the background and concerns of its authors,
one could easily predict what kind of report they would write. No other
Wickersham Commission report nor any of the crime commission
reports of the 1920s involved the civil liberties perspective of the Report
on Lawlesness in Law Enforcement. The surviving documents do not
help to explain how these three individuals were selected for the
115
The most likely explanation for the origins of the Report on
report.
Lawlesness in Law Enforcement was the fact that Chafee was a Harvard
111. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
112. See generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN
SOUTH (1969).
113. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920); Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919). Professor Chafee also wrote
another book on free speech in 1941. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES (1941).
114. NAT’L POPULAR GOV’T LEAGUE, REPORT UPON THE ILLEGAL PRACTICES OF
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 3–4 (1920); WALKER, supra note 109, at 44–
45 (arguing that the report had a significant impact on public opinion, particularly as it served
as a valuable documentation of abuses associated with the Red Scare for future generations).
Carl Stern, the third co-author, was a civil libertarian attorney, although not as well-known as
the other two.
115. The Papers of the Wickersham Commission provide no help on this question.
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Law School colleague of Roscoe Pound, the intellectual guiding force
behind the Wickersham Commission, and also that Felix Frankfurter, a
major figure in the crime commission movement and a founding
116
member of the ACLU.
The nature of the lawlessness study did provoke some controversy
within the Wickersham Commission, with some commissioners arguing
over whether to continue it or publish a final report. Oddly, some
evidence suggests that Commission Chairperson George W.
117
Wickersham was not fully aware of what the report really involved.
Some commissioners adamantly objected to the entire enterprise and
118
wanted the Commission not to publish any part of it. Nonetheless, the
report survived with its explosive evidence intact.
The report arrived at a propitious moment in the history of police
reform. In the 1930s, a new generation of reform police chiefs was
coming to the fore and began taking the police professionalization
119
The leader of this movement was O.W.
movement to a new level.
Wilson. He began writing on the subject of police administration in the
120
121
mid-1930s. His book Police Administration, first published in 1950,
eventually became the unofficial “bible” on the subject and shaped
police thinking through the 1970s. To be sure, the Wickersham Report
on Lawlesness in Law Enforcement hardly ended police misconduct.
122
Police brutality erupted into a national controversy in the 1960s and
misconduct continues today. But for the reform-minded police chiefs
who emerged in the 1930s, the report served as a valuable point of
reference and support.
The Report on Lawlesness in Law Enforcement (the report
discussing the use of the third degree) completely overshadowed the
116. WALKER, supra note 109, at 44–45, 66; see Harvard Law School Deans Throughout
History, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/spotlight/classroom/rela
ted/hls-deans.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2013.).
117. See CALDER, supra note 1, at 97.
118. Id. at 96–97 (discussing this controversy).
119. See generally WALKER, supra note 66, at 53–54, 56–57.
120. See WILLIAM J. BOPP, “O.W.”: O.W. WILSON AND THE SEARCH FOR A POLICE
PROFESSION 152 (1977); WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
supra note 1, at 172.
121. O.W. WILSON, POLICE ADMINISTRATION (1st ed. 1950). Throughout the years
several versions of the book were released.
See, e.g., O.W. WILSON, POLICE
ADMINISTRATION (2d ed. 1963); O.W. WILSON & ROY CLINTON MCLAREN, POLICE
ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1972).
122. WALKER, supra note 66, at 132–33.
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modest Report on Police, 123 written by August Vollmer, then near the
end of his career as the leader of the first era of the police
124
It closely resembled other police
professionalization movement.
investigations of the 1920s, including the relevant chapters of the various
crime commissions, and reiterated what had developed as the standard
prescription for police professionalization: the elimination of “politics,”
the hiring of experienced managers as police chiefs, and the
125
improvement of police officer recruitment and training standards.
3. The Report on Prosecution and the Administration of Criminal
Justice as a System
The curious aspect of the Report on Prosecution is the contrast
between the 38-page report itself and the 298 pages of supplemental
“Criminal Justice Surveys and Analysis,” which includes a still-useful
104-page bibliography on studies of the administration of justice. The
supplemental report was written by Alfred Bettman who had previously
126
Most
written the chapter on prosecution for the pioneering survey.
important, the supplemental materials included a discussion of the
interrelationships among criminal justice agencies, which was grounded
in the analysis of the “Mortality Statistics” of criminal cases as they
127
The mortality issue
proceeded from arrest through final disposition.
128
had been first noted but not analyzed by the Cleveland Survey. The
Wickersham Report found “strik[ing]” the number of ways “a
prosecution may be terminated,” which included a “large number of
129
It also noted the
different steps or stages” in the criminal process.
“interrelationships between the various parts of the administration of
130
criminal cases and their reflex effects upon each other.” Although the
authors of the report did not fully understand the significance of what
they had found, they had in fact stumbled upon a phenomenon that
123. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON POLICE
(1931) [hereinafter REPORT ON POLICE].
124. WALKER, supra note 1, at 154.
125. REPORT ON POLICE, supra note 123, at 140; WALKER, supra note 66, at 70–71, 129–
30.
126. See REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 66, at v. The chapter on prosecution is
in FOSDICK ET AL., supra note 67, at xii–xiii (showing the Chapter on Prosecution, written by
Alfred Bettman, beginning on page eighty-five in the Table of Contents).
127. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 66, at 52–53.
128. See FOSDICK ET AL., supra note 67, at 89–96.
129. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 66, at 55.
130. Id. at 58.
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thirty-six years later the President’s Crime Commission would identify
131
as the “systems” model of the administration of justice. As discussed
later in this Article, the systems model would dominate professional
thinking about criminal justice, making the phrase “criminal justice
system” commonplace, and would shape research and policy making in
132
the field from that time to the present. It is interesting to speculate on
the course of criminal justice studies, and the subsequent impact on
policy, had the work of the Wickersham Commission, and the Report on
Prosecution, in particular, not been short-circuited by the Great
Depression. Had the systems approach to the administration of justice
been developed in the 1930s, it is quite possible that the research and
reform efforts that emerged in the 1960s might have been advanced by
decades.
The recommendations of the Report on Prosecution were a mixture
of modest proposals that were similar to those of previous crime
commissions and some very far-reaching proposals. In the conventional
mode, the report recommended the “[e]limination . . . of political
considerations” in the selection and appointment of federal prosecutors;
the better “selection and tenure of [state] prosecutors”; and
improvements in the “organization of the legal profession” in order to
133
provide a higher quality of criminal justice personnel. The report also
recommended the “systematized control of prosecutions in each State
under a director of public prosecutions,” which was clearly a strategy for
eliminating what was considered improper local political influence on
134
The fifth and last recommendation was more far
the justice system.
reaching than the others, calling for the “[p]rovision for legal
135
interrogation of accused persons under suitable safeguards.” With its
attention to the deprivation of individual rights, the recommendation
paralleled the attention to civil liberties in both the Wickersham Report
on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement and the Report on the Enforcement
136
of the Deportation Laws of the United States.
131. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 53–67 (1967) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY].
132. See id.; infra Part VI.
133. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 66, at 37–38.
134. Id. at 38.
135. Id.
136. Compare id. 37–38, with REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS, supra note 89, at 340–47, and
REPORT ON DEPORTATION, supra note 104, at 133–49.
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4. The Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the
United States
The Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the
United States resembles the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement
137
in its concern for the deprivation of individual rights of defendants. In
general, the report is a fairly strong indictment of the deportation
process. The “[o]bjectionable [f]eatures” of the process involved the
138
“[i]nvasion of [p]ersonal [r]ights,” which included illegal searches and
seizures, inquisitorial examinations, the lack of representation by legal
counsel (which it labeled “[o]ne of the most striking features” of the
139
process), the “despotic powers” of the administrative agency, and
140
other related problems.
The causes of the abuses in the deportation process, the report
argued, included the low social status of most of the suspects as foreignborn immigrants and public indifference to personal rights in general,
141
It took special note of the
and for low status people in particular.
impact of the deportation process on the families of suspects and
142
Such
deportees, and called for exceptions in cases of hardship.
concern for the plight of the powerless was expressed only in the
Wickersham Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement. Additionally,
the report expressed concern for deportees whose “lives may be in
danger because of their political opinions” if they were returned to their
native lands, and recommended that they should be allowed to go to a
143
Concern about the status of
different country at their own expense.
immigrants and associated civil liberties issues was rare in the political
atmosphere of the 1920s, a decade marked by the notoriously
discriminatory “national origins” quota system of the 1924 Immigration
144
Act.
The Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the
United States’s Conclusions and Recommendations were mixed. On the
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See REPORT ON DEPORTATION, supra note 104, at 133–49.
See id. at 133.
Id. at 135, 137–38, 143.
See id. at 144–49.
See id. at 154–55.
Id. at 128–30, 179.
Id. at 179.
See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860–1925 (1955) (providing the classic account of American Nativism
for the time period).
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one hand, it declared that vigorous enforcement of existing deportation
laws was “necessary” in order “to rid the country of undesirable
residents unlawfully here” and it was necessary to strengthen agencies to
145
Nonetheless, the “apprehension and
prevent unlawful entry.
examination” of suspects was “often characterized by methods
unconstitutional, tyrranic [sic], and oppressive,” which resulted in some
146
people being wrongfully deported. It added that there had not been a
“proper study” of the deportation process, and it suggested the need for
“public findings” that would build up “a consistent body of
147
administrative law.”
The recommendations of the Report on the Enforcement of the
Deportation Laws of the United States addressed some of the problems it
had identified. Most important the report called for separating the
functions of investigation and prosecution of deportation cases and the
148
Separating the
creation of an independent tribunal for hearings.
functions was needed because the agency sits in “judgment on the cases
149
More far reaching was the
which itself has prosecuted.”
recommendation regarding the lack of competent counsel for
defendants. To remedy this, the report recommended utilizing legal aid
150
The idea of
societies to provide attorneys for criminal defendants.
legal aid for the poor was still relatively new in the United States and
only a few cities had even minimal programs, so implementation of the
recommendation was uncertain at best. Nonetheless, this was a bold
idea at a time when the requirement of legal representation for all
felony defendants in criminal cases was three decades in the future.
5. Other Wickersham Reports
The other Wickersham Commission reports were a mixed bag. The
most influential over the long term was Volume Two of the Report on
151
the Causes of Crime, which devoted nearly 400 pages to the work of
criminologists Clifford Shaw and Henry D. McKay on “Social Factors in
145.
146.
147.
148.
148.
149.
150.
151.

REPORT ON DEPORTATION, supra note 104, at 177, 179.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 177–78.
See id. at 178.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 179.
See 2 NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE
CAUSES OF CRIME (1931) [hereinafter 2 CAUSES OF CRIME].
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Juvenile Delinquency.” 152 The authority of the Commission gave Shaw
and McKay’s approach to the study of crime considerable validity, and
the study of social factors and crime eventually dominated the field of
academic criminology, eclipsing physiological and psychological
approaches. Shaw and McKay argued that the impact of various social
factors resulted in “social disorganization,” which included peer group
influence and the failure of the immediate community in high crime
153
By the time of the
neighborhoods as an agency of social control.
President’s Crime Commission in 1967, the sociological approach was
154
virtually unchallenged.
Volume I of the Report on the Causes of Crime reinforced Volume
II, concluding that “social influences” represented the “soundest data”
155
on criminal behavior. Volume I is notable for shying away from one
of its own insights about criminal behavior in America. It noted the
problem that a large volume of “crime” involved behavior that many
people regarded as legitimate private recreation that had been
criminalized.
The most important, of course, involved drinking
156
The result was an over-burdened
alcoholic beverages and gambling.
criminal justice system, which impeded effective response to more
serious crimes about which there was a broad social consensus. This
problem would draw attention in the 1960s, when it was labeled the
157
and attention was given to
“[c]risis of [o]ver-criminalization,”
decriminalizing alcohol-related and mental health-related behaviors.
Recognition of this problem by the Report on the Causes of Crime, in
short, was decades ahead of its times.
Also influential over the long term was the Report on Penal
Institutions: Probation and Parole for its strong endorsement of these
institutions, and its principles of the indeterminate sentence and
158
These practices had
individualized sentences that underlay them.
152. See id. at ix.
153. Id. at 387, 390–91.
154. See SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 131; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 5–6
(1967) [hereinafter CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY].
155. 1 NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE
CAUSES OF CRIME 139 (1931) [hereinafter 1 CAUSES OF CRIME].
156. See id. at 12–13.
157. See generally Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157 (1967).
158. See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PENAL
INSTITUTIONS: PROBATION AND PAROLE 172 (1931) [hereinafter PENAL INSTITUTIONS].
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become nearly universal in the United States by the 1920s, but
authorities were still in the process of developing a set of professional
159
practices. The Wickersham Commission endorsement was reinforced
160
by the 1939–1940 Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures,
and by the mid-1960s these practices had become virtually unquestioned
as the proper approach to criminal sentencing and the release of
161
offenders.
The Report on the Cost of Crime was an ambitious effort that
concluded that the “ultimate economic cost of crime to the
162
community . . . can not [sic] be ascertained.” It added that it was also
163
not possible to determine the cost of crime to individual victims. The
Report on Crime and Foreign Born, meanwhile, reached the politically
unpopular conclusion that immigrants actually committed fewer crimes
164
It noted that the idea that immigrants
than native-born Americans.
were responsible for a high proportion of the crime in America had
165
prevailed since the earliest days of the United States. The conclusion
was particularly courageous because the 1920s were a time of strong
anti-immigrant feelings, marked by the 1924 Immigration Act, which
imposed a notorious national origins quota system that discriminated
166
against southern and eastern Europeans.
167
The Report on Criminal Procedure and the Progress Report on the
168
Study of the Federal Courts were particularly disappointing. The
Report on Criminal Procedure ignored issues that were dramatically
159. See id. The report actually consisted of two separate documents, the formal Report
on Penal Institutions: Probation and Parole and an equally long (about 170 pages long) Report
of the Advisory Committee on Penal Institutions: Probation and Parole. See id. at v–vi.
160. See 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES (1939).
161. See CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 154, at 141–46. In the late 1960s,
however, the indeterminate sentence and parole would come under sharp attack by both
conservatives and liberals, and these attacks would spark a vigorous debate over criminal
sentencing in the 1970s that led to the adoption of sentencing guidelines as the most popular
alternative. See WALKER, supra note 1, at 218–19.
162. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE COST
OF CRIME 69 (1931) [hereinafter COST OF CRIME].
163. Id.
164. CRIME AND FOREIGN BORN, supra note 107, at 195.
165. Id. at 23.
166. See generally HIGHAM, supra note 144 (discussing discrimination at that time).
167. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (1931) [hereinafter REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE].
168. See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, PROGRESS
REPORT ON THE STUDY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1931) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS].
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raised by the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement and, consistent
with the Report on Prosecution, confined its recommendations to
changing public and professional attitudes on the selection of judges and
improving the quality of the lower criminal courts. The Report on
Criminal Procedure did include some thoughtful suggestions on
alternatives to formal arrest procedures, including citations,
169
administrative adjustment, and summons —ideas that became popular
in the 1960s. The Report on the Study of Federal Courts was officially a
“Progress Report” and consists of data from an ambitious study of case
170
processing in the federal system, but with no findings or conclusions.
VI. AFTER WICKERSHAM: SUBSEQUENT CRIME COMMISSIONS
The Depression and World War II prevented the recommendations
of the Wickersham Commission from having much immediate impact on
public policy. The reports on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement; the
Causes of Crime; and Penal Institutions: Probation and Parole had a
significant, long-term impact in shaping developments in their respective
fields—although it is difficult to assess the process of that impact. There
were two national-level events on crime policy in the 1930s, though only
one should be seen as a follow-up to the Wickersham Commission. The
1934 Attorney General’s Conference on Crime focused entirely on
171
crime control, in response to fears of a national crime wave, and gave
no attention to the reform of criminal justice agencies, which was the
172
The now
focus of many of the Wickersham Commission reports.
largely forgotten Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures
(1939–1940) was a direct follow-up to the Wickersham Commission,
173
Reiterating the
focusing on sentencing, probation, and parole.
Wickersham Commission’s endorsement of these practices, it furthered
the work of the Wickersham Commission in establishing a national
consensus on those practices. More significant with respect to the
administration of justice was the American Bar Foundation (ABF)
Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States
(1953–1969). This privately sponsored effort conducted pioneering field

169. See REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 167, at 46–47 (1931).
170. See FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 168, at iii, v.
171. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CONFERENCE ON CRIME
(1936) [hereinafter CONFERENCE ON CRIME]; WALKER, supra note 1, at 157–58.
172. See CONFERENCE ON CRIME, supra note 171.
173. See id. at XV–XVII.
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research on policing, prosecution, and sentencing. 174 It was particularly
influential in identifying the issue of police discretion, including all of its
attendant problems, and the practice of plea bargaining. The survey’s
175
reports were delayed, but at least two, Arrest (addressing police
176
discretion) and Conviction (examining plea bargaining), immediately
177
became classic works on their respective subjects. Most important, the
ABF survey field research discovered the many social, legal, and
organizational factors that affect decision making in the administration
of justice. In that respect, the ABF survey picked up the tentative
insights of the crime commissions of the 1920s and the Wickersham
Commission about the causes of the “mortality” of criminal cases and
explored them more fully.
The 1965–1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Criminal Justice, popularly known as the President’s
Crime Commission, was the true follow-up to the Wickersham
Commission, as an attempt to survey the entire administration of
178
It proved to be the transformative event in the history of
justice.
American criminal justice, with ramifications that continue to influence
the research, policy, and both professional and public understanding of
the subject. The Commission’s final report, The Challenge of Crime in a
179
and the accompanying nine Task Force Reports,
Free Society,
Research Studies and Consultant’s Papers, brought unprecedented
public and professional attention to the issues of crime and criminal
justice, and was accompanied by the first significant infusion of federal
financial assistance to criminal justice. The Commission sponsored
174. Samuel Walker, Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm: The
American Bar Foundation Survey, 1953–1969, 9 JUST. Q. 47, 54 (1992).
175. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY 63–82 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965).
176. See DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 49, 68 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1966).
177. See Walker, supra note 174, at 49 (“Arrest is universally regarded as a classic.”).
The results of the ABF survey were published in a five volume series. See ROBERT O.
DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF
SENTENCE (Frank J. Remington ed., 1969); LAFAVE, supra note 175; FRANK W. MILLER,
PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (Frank J. Remington
ed., 1970); NEWMAN, supra note 176; LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME:
STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND
ENTRAPEMENT (Frank J. Remington ed., 1967).
178. See Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Foreword to CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note
154.
179. CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 154.
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pioneering field research, the most important of which resulted in
180
scholarly books and articles by Albert J. Reiss and Donald Black that
continue to influence police research. The Commission’s work also
marked the advent of federal funding for, and in that respect gave a
powerful and lasting boost to, social science research on criminal justice.
A decade later, one could say that a genuine “research revolution” was
181
under way, and it continued unabated in the following decades.
The most important contribution of the President’s Crime
Commission was the Task Force Report: Science and Technology, which
followed up on the Wickersham Commission’s Report on Prosecution’s
tentative insights into the interrelationships of the various justice
agencies and the many ways a criminal case could exit the process. It
formulated a comprehensive model of the administration of justice and
gave birth to the concept of a “criminal justice system,” which
immediately became commonplace. The Task Force’s graphic model of
the system appeared in virtually every text on criminal justice. The
“systems” approach continues to guide research and policy making to
this day, focusing attention on the overall functioning of the system, the
various exit points for criminal cases, and the discretionary decisions
182
each one involves. As noted earlier, the impact of the systems model
has been so profound and lasting that one cannot avoid speculating on
how the course of American criminal justice might have been different
had circumstances permitted serious pursuit of the Wickersham’s initial
insights in the decade of the 1930s.
The Task Force Report: Science and Technology gives no evidence,
however, of an influence of the Wickersham Commission’s earlier work.
Nor is there any evidence in the other volumes of any reference to the
specific work of its predecessor. The indeterminate sentence, the
principle of individualized sentences, probation, and parole had become
so thoroughly institutionalized over the intervening three decades that
there was evidently no perceived need to look back to one of the
180. See DONALD BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE, xi–xii (1980)
(basing the study on original field research); ALBERT J. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE
PUBLIC x–xi (1971) (basing the study on original field research); see also SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 131, at 7–10 (providing the factors related to clearing crimes by
arrest). The larger study inspired by the Task Force’s report is PETER W. GREENWOOD ET
AL., THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS (1977).
181. See WALKER, supra note 1, at 206; see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 20–21 (Wesley Skogan &
Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004).
182. Walker, supra note 174, at 71–72.
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milestones in their development. Field studies of the police sponsored
by the President’s Commission did explore the dynamics of policecitizen interactions and produced the first quantitative data on police
use of force and excessive force. In this respect, the Wickersham Report
on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement did have some indirect influence.
In general, though, it is safe to conclude that the Wickersham
Commission had little direct influence on the later and more important
national crime commission.
VII. A BRIEF NOTE ON HERBERT HOOVER’S POST-PRESIDENTIAL
YEARS
Herbert Hoover’s post-presidential years are relevant to his Article
in one respect only: the so-called Hoover Commission. 183 Hoover spent
the last three decades of his life as the grand old man of the Republican
Party, the living embodiment of pre-Franklin D. Roosevelt and pre-New
Deal America. He strongly opposed the vast expansion of the size and
scope of the federal government and its involvement in virtually every
phase of American life, and as a result he projected a public image of
conservatism that was not representative of his career as a public
184
Bitter over the criticisms of his “failure” as President, he
servant.
contributed to the near-complete eclipse of his pre-war record as a
185
moderate and progressive Republican.
Hoover’s one notable public activity in his post-presidential years
was chairing the Hoover Commission.
Congress created the
Commission on Organization of Executive Branch of Government in
186
1947 and President Harry Truman appointed Hoover to chair it. With
a list of luminaries as members of the Commission, a large staff the
Commission published nineteen reports with 273 separate
187
recommendations. It completed its work in June 1949, and Congress
183. See generally REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, supra
note 7, at v; GARY DEAN BEST, HERBERT HOOVER: THE POSTPRESIDENTIAL YEARS 1933–
1964 (1983); BURNER, supra note 10, at 336–37.
184. BEST, supra note 183, at xv–xvi .
185. HOFF WILSON, supra note 6, at 209–31. Hoover’s reputation was also permanently
stained by his order for the army to roust the Bonus Army in the summer of 1932. DONALD
J. LISIO, THE PRESIDENT AND PROTEST: HOOVER, MACARTHUR, AND THE BONUS RIOT
297–98 (2nd ed. 1994). Although hardly representative of his public career, he bears direct
responsibility for the unnecessary tragedy. Id.
186. BEST, supra note 183, at 312.
187. Id. at 327. See generally REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH, supra note 7.
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passed the Government Reorganization Act that year. 188
The
Commission was a fitting coda to Hoover’s career as a public servant, as
it embodied his commitment to address an important social problem
through the careful gathering of facts. In this instance the problem was
the enormous expansion of the Executive Branch as a result of the New
Deal and World War II, and in keeping with his previous commission
efforts, he did not challenge the institutions under review but sought
only to make them more efficient. The Commission was so highly
regarded that his name became the standard shorthand term for it
(“Hoover Commission”). Some Republicans hoped that the Hoover
Commission would scale back the power of the Executive Branch, but
189
they were sorely disappointed. In fact, some observers argue that the
Commission only strengthened the Executive Branch by helping to
190
make it more efficient. The Hoover Commission’s work was honored
by imitation. Congress created a second Hoover Commission in 1955,
191
with the then 80-year-old Hoover as its chair. The state of California,
meanwhile, created a “‘Little Hoover Commission” that was eventually
transformed into a permanent government body to study its various
192
government agencies that continues today.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Herbert Hoover’s career as a public servant began with fifteen years
of enormous success and then ended with a disaster that was beyond his
control and, which for the remaining thirty-one years of his life,
overshadowed all of his previous accomplishments. Hoover was
arguably the most competent executive ever to serve as President of the
United States, with a clear vision of moderate social reform. Far from
being a narrow pro-business adherent of laissez-faire doctrine, as
popular stereotypes hold, he was concerned about a broad range of
188. BEST, supra note 183, at 409.
189. See BURNER, supra note 10, at 337.
190. Id. at 336–37; see Peri E. Arnold, The First Hoover Commission and the Managerial
Presidency, 38 J. POL. 46, 70 (1976).
191. Hoover himself estimated that 72% of the first Hoover Commission
recommendations were adopted during the Truman Administration, compared with 64% of
the second commission’s recommendations under the Eisenhower Administration. HOFF
WILSON, supra note 6, at 225.
192. The Milton Marks Commission on California State Government Organization and
Economy was created in 1962 and refers to itself at the “Little Hoover Commission.” About
Us, LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, http://www.lhc.ca.gov/about/about.html (last visited Mar.
7, 2013).
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social and economic problems. To all of them he brought his training as
an engineer and a commitment to the gathering and analysis of facts that
would guide moderate, practical reforms.
The Wickersham
Commission, the first national study of crime and criminal justice, was a
natural expression of his approach to the improvement of American life.
Largely because of the tragedy of the Great Depression that
descended on the country within months after Hoover became
President, the Wickersham Commission has largely disappeared from
history. It is mainly remembered for its Report on Prohibition, which
refused to call for repeal of the experiment in outlawing alcoholic
beverages. The neglect of the Commission is unfortunate, however,
because it has important relevance for understanding both Hoover’s
public career and the history of American criminal justice. With respect
to Hoover’s public career, because the Wickersham Commission is
consistent with his approach to addressing social problems, it helps to
illuminate his long overshadowed efforts and accomplishments apart
from the Great Depression. And in that regard, it helps restore his
reputation as a moderate progressive reformer. With respect to the
history of American criminal justice, the Wickersham Commission was
an important link between the vigorous crime commission movement of
the 1920s and subsequent studies of the American criminal justice
system.
Two Wickersham Commission reports, the Report on
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement and the Report on the Enforcement of
the Deportation Laws of the United States, touched on issues of due
process and equal protection, which would become major controversies
in the 1960s. Two other reports, the Report on the Causes of Crime and
the Report on Penal Institutions: Probation and Parole, gave a strong
boost to ideas and practices that became unchallenged in American
criminal justice. A third report, the Report on Prosecution, tentatively
identified but did not pursue phenomena that would later become part
of the accepted model of the criminal justice system. In the end, both
Herbert Hoover and the Wickersham Commission deserve better fates
at the hands of historians and criminal justice scholars.

